It is within this climate of uncertainty that public curiosity has shifted. Rather than asking only whether a global war could happen, people have begun asking what it would look like if it did. This shift is significant. It reflects a deeper loss of confidence in the idea that catastrophe is unthinkable. History has repeatedly shown that wars do not always begin with clear intent or long-term planning. They often emerge from miscalculations, misunderstandings, wounded pride, and moments when escalation outpaces diplomacy.
As public concern has grown, experts in nuclear history and military strategy have sought to clarify misconceptions. One of the most important clarifications involves the idea of “targets.” Popular imagination often assumes that the first targets in a nuclear conflict would be the largest and most famous cities. While population centers certainly carry symbolic and economic weight, modern nuclear strategy is driven less by symbolism and more by capability.
In 2025, nuclear historian Alex Wellerstein of the Stevens Institute of Technology explained that in a nuclear scenario, early strikes would likely focus on an adversary’s ability to respond. The logic is grim but strategic: if one side believes a conflict is unavoidable, its first objective would be to limit retaliation.
Wellerstein noted that if the adversary were a major nuclear power such as Russia, the most likely initial targets would be command-and-control centers and intercontinental ballistic missile sites. These locations matter not because of their size or fame, but because of what they enable. A different type of attacker, particularly a non-state or rogue actor, might prioritize population centers or symbolic landmarks instead, but state-level nuclear strategy follows a colder calculus.
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